Last week, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh remembered the Opposition for strange reasons. First, in defending his Government's discovery of reckless populism, he blamed the erstwhile NDA regime for all the economic ills of India. Two days later, he changed tack, praised Atal Bihari Vajpayee as the Bhishmapitamah of politics and appealed to the BJP to see the sense behind the proposed Indo-US nuclear agreement.

Since competitive politics involves demonising the opponent, it is hardly surprising that many BJP members have responded to the flattery of Vajpayee with suspicion. The general feeling is that that Manmohan is trying to be too clever by half -- damning the BJP on issues that suit the Left and appealing to its patriotism on a matter which is unlikely to enthuse the Communists.

Expediency and low cunning may well be a part of the Congress' political armoury but that is no reason for viewing every issue through the prism of realpolitik. In the past, foreign policy was thought to be bipartisan -- although there is no evidence to suggest it was so. War was another event that brought all nationalist forces together -- although the nitpicking of the Congress during the 1999 Kargil conflict was, to say the least, dishonourable. The question is: Should the two national parties forge a common stand on the Indo-US nuclear accord? It should, of course, be remembered that a convergence on one issue should have no bearing on the future of the UPA Government. If the Left withdraws support, the BJP can hardly be expected to salvage the situation for Congress.

The argument for a common stand on the nuclear issue is not far-fetched. Unlike the Communists who appear to be batting for some other country, both the Congress and the BJP have a common commitment to a strong India. The Congress may not have been enthused by the 1998 nuclear tests but it is fair to say that it has subsequently veered to the view that India's strategic programme is not negotiable. Resurrecting Manmohan's opposition to Pokhran-II in Parliament is about as meaningful as replaying what Yashwant Sinha said in the immediate aftermath of the Babri demolition in 1992. Politics is never static and politicians are adept at adjusting to new circumstances.

A further point of convergence is the attitude of both parties to the US. Here, too, there is a definite strand of continuity between the initiatives taken by Vajpayee and their follow through by Manmohan. The nuclear deal was a bold extension of the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) document signed during the NDA regime. Of course, both parties have dissidents. There are Congress stalwarts who continue to hark back on non-alignment and the BJP has its share of isolationists. But the mainstream view of both parties is that India must forge a strategic partnership with the US on mutually beneficial terms.

The BJP, it is interesting to note, hasn't repudiated the idea of a nuclear agreement with the US. Its more sober standpoint is that the present agreement is hamstrung by the Hyde Act and the US Administration's accommodation of the non-proliferation lobby. The BJP has said it will re-negotiate the deal when it returns to power. The commitment to re-negotiation suggests that the BJP has no fundamental objection to India breaking its nuclear isolation.

Since foreign policy formulation cannot be separated from the real world, will re-negotiation necessarily get India a better deal than the one on offer?

The answer, unfortunately, is not encouraging. President George W Bush is in his last year and it is likely that he will be succeeded by either Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton or John McCain. Apart from Senator Obama whose views are unpredictable and in the process of evolution, the other two Senators have indicated to responsible Indians that they would be happy if the nuclear deal is signed, sealed and delivered in the remaining months of Bush. The reasons are well known: Clinton has a formidable non-proliferation baggage she cannot easily discard and McCain has stressed his commitment to multilateral institutions that are interested in capping all nuclear ambitions. The next US President would rather inherit Bush's India legacy rather than initiate a new round of Indian exceptionalism.

In many ways, Bush wasn't a conventional US President. He broke strongly with the State Department in offering India a de-facto place on the nuclear high table. His successor will be disinclined to treat India differently from, say, Iran, North Korea and Pakistan. In other words, India has a limited window of opportunity before the exceptional discount offered by Bush lapses. Re-negotiation sounds a harmless diversion if there is a guarantee that the very same terms the present Indian Government has secured will be re-offered, perhaps with new packaging.

Unfortunately, there is nothing to suggest that will be the case. On the contrary, the indications are that the US will balk at Bush's generosity and will want India to sign the CTBT as the price for wider nuclear cooperation. When Manmohan says that he has got a better deal than what the NDA Government was willing to settle for, he is not wrong. That's not because Vajpayee's negotiators were too gullible. The difference is the "Bush factor" which came to the fore in July 2005 and which will lapse later this year.

The choice before India is stark: Accept what it has managed now or settle for far less in future. It's not that India will collapse if the deal doesn't go through. There is nothing to suggest that the strategic programme will be crippled. However, the perpetuation of nuclear isolation will put paid to all nuclear energy plans and compromise our future energy security. Without a meaningful nuclear energy option, India may become over-dependent on the civilisational munificence of the oil-producing economies. The BJP, at least, knows what that means.

Courtesy: www.dailypioneer.com, March 09, 2008