Notwithstanding the deployment of an estimated 90,000 Pakistani troops along the Afghan border in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, the situation is far from stable in a region that is vital to Islamabad and Washington. State authority is increasingly fragile in the region, with recurrent violence undermining official Pakistani claims that the situation is "under control."

Despite the "intense" Army operations in FATA, frontline Taliban and al-Qaida operatives still maintain a significant presence in the region, adding to the problems of the already-challenged U.S.-led coalition forces in neighboring Afghanistan. Although the Musharraf regime has claimed that many terrorists have been evicted, there is mounting evidence that the jihadi presence in FATA is strengthening, that Islamist extremists are regularly confronting the Pakistani state, and that they control a substantial area in Waziristan, to such an extent as to make a permanent military presence impossible.

The numbers tell the story. Throughout 2005, 285 people, including 92 civilians and 158 terrorists, were killed in Waziristan in 165 incidents. In 2006, the death toll was 590, including 109 civilians, 144 soldiers and 337 terrorists, in 248 incidents. Already through July 13, 2007, however, approximately 477 people, including 57 civilians and 400 terrorists, have died, an unambiguous indication of the situation in Pakistan's most troubled region. In one recent spell of violence, from June 19-23, at least 44 people were killed in Pakistan's North Waziristan due to alleged missile and mortar attacks from across the border in Afghanistan. Given Islamabad's understated accounts, the suppression of the press and erratic reportage, the actual numbers could be much higher.

Not surprisingly, across the border in Afghanistan, coalition troops are finding it difficult to control the rapid escalation in the insurgency. Col. Martin P. Schweitzer, commander of the U.S. Task Force Fury in the region, said June 22 that the number of militants reported moving over the Afghan-Pakistan border has increased in recent months. Terrorist attacks in Afghan provinces bordering Pakistan where the U.S. military operates rose 250 percent in May 2007 compared with May 2006, according to figures the U.S. military gave the Associated Press.

That the Taliban had gained immense influence in the FATA was officially acknowledged when the Musharraf regime entered into an agreement with them on September 5, 2006. However, U.S. military and NATO officials now believe that attacks have risen sharply since the deal.

"I think everybody recognizes that, at this point, the political deal in Waziristan has not stopped the militancy," Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher said in Islamabad in March 2007. U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates told reporters at the Pentagon on March 7 that "the Taliban and al-Qaida have been able to use the areas around, particularly North Waziristan, to regroup and it is a problem."

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More recently, in an interview with Bloomberg Television, U.S. National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley said Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf has failed to contain al-Qaida and must regain control over areas bordering Afghanistan where the terrorist group is free to plan new attacks. The failure of General Musharraf's strategy in the tribal areas "has allowed some pooling of Taliban," Hadley said. "It has allowed the reestablishment of some operational training areas. It has allowed some planning," he added. Boucher told a House panel July 12 that al-Qaida terrorists have "found more freedom to operate" in the Pakistani border area since Musharraf gave tribal leaders more freedom to control the area.

Earlier, in April 2004, the Musharraf regime had also signed a deal with the Taliban in South Waziristan. With the retreat of the state, Taliban and al-Qaida militants from a number of regions, including Afghanistan, Central Asia and the Arab world, went on a rampage. A majority of the foreign militants are reportedly from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which is led by Tahir Yuldashev and his local associates, including Noor Islam, Javed Zalikhel and Maulana Abdul Aziz.

With Islamabad's strategy to quiet the chaotic Waziristan region along the Afghan border having failed, the mountainous terrain along the Durand Line provides a secure pathway and safe hideout for the Taliban and al-Qaida. Taliban have regrouped rather well in the Afghan countryside, particularly in provinces along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border like Paktika, Nangarhar and Khost. Those provinces can be infiltrated from Pakistan despite the presence of 90,000 Pakistani troops on the Pakistan side, suggesting the Taliban and al-Qaida have been provided operating space by the Pakistani military.

Islamabad has been trying since 2002 to evict or neutralize the terrorists in Waziristan. A majority of them, wanted in their home countries, have been holed up there for years and it is unlikely that they could be persuaded to leave of their own accord. After the April 2004 agreement, not a single terrorist left the region. The marginal reduction in their numbers since then appears primarily due to the fact that many have been killed in action.

When operations were launched against the Taliban and al-Qaida in the FATA in 2002, the Army, under enormous pressure from the United States, was convinced that a military victory was essential. Five years down the line, it is the proponents of a violent jihad who have achieved strategic success. The Pakistan Army has failed in its quest for a military victory. The Taliban have de facto control over most of Waziristan and, more importantly, have freedom of movement and action across the region.

The Taliban presence on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, which shows every sign of consolidation over time, could have disastrous consequences over the long run, for both Islamabad and Kabul.

A stable Afghanistan is America's primary foreign policy agenda within the region. South Asia, however, remains an area of manifest confusion under the microscope of the Bush administration. Pakistan has hoped that its U.S. alliance would secure immunity from adverse international action on the issue of support to cross border terrorism in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. The military operation to end the recent Red Mosque standoff in the capital Islamabad has only partially repaired the damage done by the FATA situation to Pakistan's image in the West as an essential ally against Islamist terrorism.

Though the combined operational effectiveness of Afghan-U.S. Forces has been relatively good, it is the competing foreign policy agendas of the United States and Pakistan that are the biggest obstacle in dealing with the Taliban and the Pakistan-Afghanistan quagmire. Pakistan's ambivalence and strategic ambitions have impeded effective action, and provided abiding safe haven and an expanding sphere of dominance for the Taliban and al-Qaida in its border areas.

Specifically, Pakistan is seeking to regain the foothold it lost in Afghanistan after the U.S. rout of the Taliban. Pending a U.S. solution or exit, the Pakistani leadership will continue to seek means to recover leverage in Afghanistan. Perhaps most importantly, Pakistan is concerned that an Afghan regime friendlier to India could leave Pakistan sandwiched between two adversaries, something which no regime in Islamabad would find acceptable.

Despite the Pakistan's own rising difficulties, there does not appear to be a sufficient determination to make the necessary changes in policy and strategic objectives that must precede effective action against the Taliban. The Taliban consolidation and violence on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border can, consequently, be expected to continue to grow in the foreseeable future.

Kanchan Lakshman is a research fellow at the Institute for Conflict Management in New Delhi, India.

Courtesy: www.worldpoliticsreview.com, July 25, 2007