The counter-terror strategy in India usually follows a predictable pattern after every act of terrorism. Grandiose statements are made that we will not "tolerate" terrorism and that the nation will not be cowed down by such acts of "cowardice." An avalanche of VIP visits follows, disturbing the law and order machinery. After this a competition starts within the media, with different news organisations airing different theories about the perpetrators. Then leaks appear that the Central agencies had already alerted the state concerned, but the latter had failed to act upon such prior "intelligence." Faced with this the state chief minister announces that a "new" agency will be created to tackle terrorism. In the end, everything dies down. Then a new terror strike takes place, and the charade starts all over again.

The Hyderabad attacks of August 25 were no exception. Immediately after the incident, media speculation on the perpetrators ranged from HuJI to Naxalites, with LeT, Dawood and Jaish thrown in for good measure. Initially, Andhra Pradesh chief minister Y.S.R. Reddy pleaded helplessness saying that the conspiracy had been hatched abroad. His statement regarding the complicity of a certain country evoked a sharp riposte from their foreign office spokeswoman. Then the government changed tack and said that an elite force like the "Greyhounds" would be created. It was also announced that the state would recruit 100 linguists (knowing Arabic, Turkish, Persian, Pushto, Bangla, Uzbek, Baluchi, Kurdish, Hebrew, Spanish and Chechen) to "fight terror." One only hopes that this will not give rise to another diplomatic furore, since the countries which use these languages can legitimately protest that they are not the origins of such terror.

This time also information got leaked that the state had failed to act upon the Intelligence Bureau's (IB) warning. The contents of the warning were never spelt out. Only one newspaper published that the warning "was too vague." It also said that the modules could take up "some sensational terrorist acts in Mumbai, Bangalore and/or Hyderabad." Does this amount to actionable intelligence? A retired IB director defended such alerts by saying that it was left to the state police to infiltrate such modules and extract actionable intelligence.

After the sensational railway attacks of 7/11 in Mumbai last year, the then Mumbai police commissioner had told us that in his several meetings with the IB at the highest level before the incident he had never been given any indication that the Mumbai suburban railway system would be attacked. In fact, it seems that Central intelligence had indicated that religious places would be targeted. Yet, the Prime Minister gently chided Mumbai police in one of his speeches.

This shadow boxing has to stop. The public is tired of these ping-pong battles between the states and the Central agencies. The state satraps have to realise that they cannot replicate national intelligence agencies at the level of the state. Immediately after 7/11 it was announced that Maharashtra would "revamp" its intelligence machinery and recruit "non-police officials" similar to the old city Special Branch. One does not know what happened to that. Even if such "revamping" is done, its results will be experienced after decades. The old Bombay Special Branch, which I had the opportunity to head in the Seventies, had a hard core of non-transferable non-police officials who met the then challenges admirably. Unfortunately, that system was allowed to wind up, and the non-police officials gravitated to "profitable" police branches under political influence. Where is the guarantee that something similar will not happen again?

Acting upon the Andhra decision, other states might also announce the creation of such "elite" forces. But recruiting 100 linguists for a state force for communication intelligence can at best be a pipe-dream. Even our Central agencies are perennially short of linguists, especially those speaking foreign languages. Most of these posts are lying vacant. Even if one is able to recruit that many linguists has anyone considered the sheer volume of the data that will have to be transcribed and then converted into actionable intelligence? How many states can procure such equipment? This reminds me of Seymour Hersh who wrote in a piece "The Intelligent Gap" well before 9/11, "The number of daily satellite-telephone calls in the Arab world, many of which are encrypted, is in the millions, creating severe difficulties for eavesdroppers." It is only for this reason that the technical intelligence on Rajiv Gandhi's assassination remained on tape and was not transcribed.

State leaders must realise the inherent handicap their forces have in penetrating terrorist modules: Terrorism is transnational, professional and secretive in nature, conducted by highly motivated cadres. State police units, on the other hand, are fragmented, largely inefficient, slow in reaction, badly trained and highly politicised. Postings in intelligence wings are a punishment. Police cadres are governed by tenure rules which prevent the growth of the professionalism needed to penetrate secretive terror units. The operational efficiency of the police units differs vastly from state to state. Coordination between police units is hardly satisfactory. Interrogation reports are not shared promptly. On the other hand, a Centralised operation against terrorism has always produced better results elsewhere, although there is no guarantee that it will eliminate terrorism. Central agencies are not governed by tenure rules. Thus there will be better accountability as they will not be able to pass the buck.

A group of ministers set up by the previous NDA government had recommended the setting up of a federal police force to tackle a federal crime like terrorism or to curb the Naxalite menace. This in the long run could have improved our capability. However, the meeting of the state chief ministers convened by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on September 5, 2006 brushed aside this suggestion. Even BJP chief ministers did not favour the move, fearing the erosion of their power. Since then, several eminent jurists have supported the idea of having a federal anti-terrorist force to tackle this nationwide scourge. But it is the state chief ministers who are resisting the idea. How many more 7/11s, Mecca Masjid and Lumbini Park incidents need to take place before these power hungry politicians are made to agree to this excellent suggestion?

V. Balachandran is a former Special Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat policy declaration that we stand firm against terrorism and have done all that is needed to guard our assets will only enhance India's image as a mature nation.

Courtesy: www.asianage.com, September 15, 2007