There we go again. One admittedly gratuitous remark from a State Department spokesman in Washington, DC, has got the entire Indian political class worked up, enraged the Ministry of External Affairs and made India's unfettered right to say what it wants (or say nothing at all) to Iran the touchstone of its independent foreign policy and ability to counter 'imperialism'.

While it is nobody's case India should outsource its foreign policy to another country, it is worth asking what role, if any, it sees for itself in the power drama of the 21st century. The war of words vis-à-vis the Iranian President's visit is just one sample of this predicament. The actions of successive Indian public officials at the International Institute of Strategic Studies conference on India, held in New Delhi over the past weekend, presented other examples.

The conference was called to discuss the theme of 'India as a Rising Great Power'. As is now common at such events, it soon became a one-way discourse. Foreign speakers were both more optimistic and hard-headed about India's role and responsibilities; key Indian speakers were evasive, diffident and plain incredulous at the idea of seeing India as a great power.

In his inaugural speech, the Commerce and Industry Minister began by saying that he found the reference to India as a 'rising great power' very "uncomfortable" and proceeded to use that word five times. Two days later, the National Security Adviser was asked to speak on India's equation with other great powers and said this was a "delicate subject". He then explained how India wanted good relations with everybody from SAARC to the European Union, Japan to West Asia, without really revealing much at all.

It led to one British delegate being quite frank in suggesting that India's intellectual contribution to the conference was below expectation. Another delegate pointed out that the world had heard of great powers, superpowers and hyperpowers, but now faced the prospect of a "nervous power". Actually, what India is burdened with is an establishment nervous at the idea of power.

When asked to enunciate specific national goals and responses to well-defined challenges, Indian foreign policy interlocutors speak in platitudes without giving away anything. Actually, there is precious little to give away. Indian grand strategy is marked by its absence. In place of clarity, one is left with generalities.

At the IISS meeting, for instance, the Foreign Secretary spoke of India's "civilisational engagement" with ASEAN. The following day, the NSA spoke of Iran being an "ancient civilisation". Almost as a pattern, a few days later an article in a newspaper sought to date the India-Iran strategic partnership to the 16th century, when the ruler in Tehran lent his troops to Humayun to displace the successors of Sher Shah Suri.

This is plain humbug. In terms of hard power, India's so-called civilisational engagement with a bewildering array of countries and regions has won it very little genuine influence. It is one thing to boast that Hindi films are watched halfway across the world and that Indian culture and soft power are geographically expansive. It is another to suggest that these can replace hard diplomacy, anchored in military and economy muscle and a trenchant security doctrine.

Take Iran again. For all the talk of India's historical understanding of the Persians, its large Shia population and sensitivities thereof, the sobering truth is New Delhi has zero leverage with Tehran. The NSA told the IISS meeting that India did not want to be part of the international dialogue with Iran on its nuclear programme. The fact is, even if India tried, Iran would not listen.

Second, conferences such as the one hosted by the IISS are attended by vast armies of retired Foreign Service and defence officers. Yet, these are taking place largely because India's trade and business links with the world have made it important and, potentially, some sort of a regional power.

The traditional strategic affairs seminarists and conference regulars don't understand this new India. Many of them live in the familiar, 1970s-era cocoon of victimhood. At one of the IISS sessions, a former Foreign Secretary asked the Foreign Minister of Sweden why India and Africa should listen to "lectures" from the European Union on human rights, given the European powers' centuries of imperialism.

It seemed so out of place. At a conference devoted to India's allegedly imminent great power leap, a senior member of its establishment had just announced that he was happy to club his country with Africa. This may have been a good PR gimmick for a Non-Aligned Summit -- at the IISS gabfest it led to eyebrows being raised.

Third, quite amazingly not one interjection or speech even mentioned the possible impact of Indian business, trade and investments overseas on the shaping of grand strategy. The spread of Indian capital and risks -- as Indian corporations acquire companies abroad and Indian equity investors buy stocks traded in markets outside the country -- is happening very fast. Safeguarding it is going to be an important source of foreign policy. The slew of commercial deals -- component manufacture, outsourcing -- between American and Indian defence companies will also generate a momentum of its own.

These are the new sinews of India's external policy, far more important than shibboleths about imperialism, neo-imperialism and human rights. Yet, is anybody ready to discuss these? Are any of the 'great and the good' in Lutyens' Delhi even willing to contemplate that the flag could follow trade, let alone be comfortable with the idea?

The fact is India -- any country, any punter -- cannot take a quantum leap by investing in risk-free bonds. It needs to gamble, judiciously and calculatedly perhaps. As it happens, India's foreign policy establishment is a remarkably cautious, conservative, 'do nothing' grouping.

The last time India took a diplomatic gamble, it tested a nuclear device at Pokhran in 1998. It was an audacious move by a new Government and a new dispensation, one unburdened by a tradition of bureaucratic calibration. For a whole host of reasons -- India's economic surge and 9/11 played their part -- that Pokhran gamble paid off. However, a decade down the line the gains of that process have reached a plateau. India needs to think and act differently once again.

The comfortable consensus in New Delhi is not going to allow that, not with this Government and not with the hamstrung-on-arrival coalition that will inevitably take office in a year (irrespective of its leadership and configuration). Like in 1998, it will take an outsider to the system to stir up Indian grand strategy and give it a fresh spin. Till then, we can wait, re-read the transcripts of the IISS conference and occasionally abuse the State Department spokesman.

Courtesy: www.dailypioneer.com, April 25, 2008