In hindsight, BSP supremo Mayawati may well come to view the Samajwadi Party's decision to join hands with the Congress as the best thing that happened since her conquest of Uttar Pradesh last year. Regardless of the outcome of Tuesday's trust vote (it is a vote on the UPA Government and not a parliamentary referendum on the abstruse Indo-US nuclear deal), Mayawati has been the big gainer from the confusion and realignments of the past four weeks. As someone put it evocatively, "she has moved into the Indian Premier League."

Mayawati's gains are impressive. First, she has for all practical purposes become the symbol of a Third Front that has been struggling to make itself felt in national politics. Prakash Karat may be right in saying that the arrangement with Mayawati is, so far, limited to opposing the nuke deal. However, barring a last-minute hiccup, it is clear that the next election will witness a combination comprising the Left Front, the remnants of UNPA, the BSP and assorted players such as the TRS. In time to come, this "Front" may well be replenished by constituents of the present UPA.

The fact that such a formidable combination has suddenly gelled owes entirely to two developments. First, what at first appeared an expedient Congress-Left separation is fast turning out to be a messy divorce. Today, the Left aren't merely disappointed with the Congress; they are livid with it. Just look at Karat's angry demeanour. The Left may yet arrive at another understanding with the Congress after the election. But this time, Karat wants to ensure that the Left is no longer the subordinate partner. By riding piggyback on an ascendant Mayawati, the Left has prevented its own future marginalisation.

Second, Mayawati's presence in the Third Front has galvanised the regional parties that had been orphaned after SP's unilateral U-turn. Unlike Mulayam Singh Yadav who was in effect a regional player, Mayawati brings electoral value-addition to any party she aligns with. In the past few days, she has demonstrated her ability to woo disgruntled Congress leaders in Haryana and Rajasthan. Most important, her alliance with the Left has made it meaningful for sullen Muslims (swayed by the religious opposition to the nuke deal) to consider her as a viable option to both the Congress and the Samajwadi Party. A Dalit-Muslim alliance, with a sprinkling of OBC and upper caste support, will be very potent in UP. In other States, her alliance with a regional player can make life very difficult for the Congress.

It is the Congress that comes out as the biggest loser from this realignment. Outside UP, Mayawati doesn't as yet have the ability to win too many parliamentary seats on her own steam but she can ensure the decimation of the Congress by taking away the core vote. A focussed BSP intervention in Haryana, Punjab, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Jammu and Kashmir and Uttaranchal has the potential of ensuring a Congress rout in North India. In due course, Mayawati's growth can affect the BJP but the first shock is invariably felt by the Congress.

For the Congress, the political future appears distinctly gloomy. The brave but contrived attempt to put the nuke deal in the forefront of the political agenda notwithstanding, the Congress and its allies are only too well aware that the real agenda for the coming General Election will be its record of economic mismanagement. Moreover, if Mayawati creams off the lower end of the Congress' social coalition and galvanises the TDP and TRS into an unlikely alliance in Andhra Pradesh, there is every possibility that the Congress tally in the next Lok Sabha will not cross three digits. The pact with the SP may do the Congress some good in UP but the force of Mayawati's countervailing mobilisation may devastate it elsewhere.

On paper this is good news for the BJP. Taking on the pincer assault of the BSP and the SP-Congress may reduce the party into a complete non-entity in UP but the losses may well be compensated by its ability to hold its own in Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Punjab and make gains in Gujarat, Bihar, Delhi and, at a pinch, Maharashtra. However, unless the BJP makes some significant gains in UP and is in a position to effect post-poll alliances with regional players in Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh, the NDA may not be in a position to form its own Government at the Centre.

In such a situation, the strategic balance is likely to tilt towards a BSP-led combination. Apart from the possibility of the Congress extending some shamefaced support for Mayawati claim on the top job -- to keep the "communal" forces out -- there is a likelihood of some UPA and NDA partners switching sides.

The next few months pose enormous challenges to those with a stake in the emergence of a strong and modern India. If Congress' national eminence is undermined by a substantial erosion of its Dalit and Muslim support, it is imperative for the BJP to try and squeeze the upper end of the Congress base and, simultaneously, consolidate its standing among the middle castes. These are social challenges that require both tactical flexibility and an aggressive campaign to win over Congress voters. Some of this flexibility was in evidence during the run-up to Tuesday's trust vote but there was also alarming indications of the all-familiar internal subterfuge that the column has alluded to in past weeks. If the BJP doesn't succeed in persuading enough Congress voters from the upper and middle castes and the middle classes to switch sides in the General Election, India may well end up with a Third Front-led Government. For L K Advani, Tuesday's vote will be a step -- albeit an important one -- in the campaign for the hearts and minds of Middle India.

Courtesy: www.dailypioneer.com, July 20, 2008